NSTL国家科技图书文献中心

1. Egalitarian roommate allocations: Complexity and stability NSTL国家科技图书文献中心

Bonifaci, Vincenzo | Dallorto, Helena Riv... - 《Theoretical computer science》 - 2025,1026 - 共10页

摘要： Roommate Allocation, where students have preferences* over* | (under* two distinct notions of payoff). Both problems* | preferences. We then analyze the problems through the lens | utilitarian matchings* and stable roommate problems.* | We study two roommate assignment problems

关键词： Roommate problem | Hedonic games | Perfect matching | Envy-freeness | Coalition formation | NP-hardness

2. Popular Solutions for Optimal Matchings NSTL国家科技图书文献中心

Telikepalli Kavitha - 《Graph-Theoretic Concepts in Computer Science》 - International Workshop on Graph-Theoretic Concepts in Computer Science - 2025, - 297～311 - 共15页

摘要： extend naturally to preferences* over matchings. A* | . The preferences* of a vertex over its neighbors* | it is only max-utility matchings* that are relevant* | -utility matchings; moreover, such a matching can be | matchings and show a compact extended formulation for the

关键词： Bipartite graphs | Stable matchings | Dual certificates

3. Maximum-utility Popular Matchings with Bounded Instability NSTL国家科技图书文献中心

ILDIKO SCHLOTTER | AGNES CSEH - 《ACM transactions on computation theory》 - 2025,17(1) - 6.1～6.35 - 共35页

摘要：In a graph where vertices have preferences | the matchings. Popular matchings* can be seen as an* | intermediate category between stable matchings* and maximum* | -size matchings. In this article, we aim to maximize | instances where preferences* on one side admit a master*

关键词： Popular matching | stable matching | complexity | master lists

4. Combining choice and response time data to analyse the ride-acceptance behavior of ride-sourcing drivers NSTL国家科技图书文献中心

Mana Meskar | Rico Krueger ... - 《Transportation research,Part C.Emerging technologies》 - 2025,171(Feb.) - 104977.1～104977.22 - 共22页

摘要： requests. Understanding drivers' preferences* is vital for* | unsuccessful matchings. We investigate the ride-acceptance | drivers' preferences* which allows us to better* | This paper investigates the ride-acceptance | behavior of drivers on ride-sourcing platforms

关键词： Ride-acceptance behavior | Drift-diffusion model | Response time | Driver preferences | Ride-sourcing

5. Robust Popular Matchings NSTL国家科技图书文献中心

Martin Bullinger | Rohith Reddy Gangam ... - 《International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: Auckland, New Zealand, 6-10 May 2024, volume 1 of 4》 - International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - 2024, - 225～233 - 共9页

摘要：We study popularity for matchings under | preferences. This solution concept captures matchings that | preferences of a single agent while obtaining N P | find a complexity dichotomy based on preference | do not lose against any other matching in a

关键词： Matchings under preferences | Popularity | Robustness

6. Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains NSTL国家科技图书文献中心

Biro P. | Csaji G. - 《Games and economic behavior》 - 2024,145 - 217～238 - 共22页 - 被引量：1

摘要： problem under* lexicographic preference domains from a* | in the strong core of fractional matchings. In | reverse-lexicographic preferences* the strong core is* | © 2024 The Author(s)We study strong core and | Pareto-optimal solutions for multiple partners matching

关键词： Computation complexity | Core | Lexicographic preferences | Many-to-many matching | Stable matchings

7. Weighted Proportional Allocations of Indivisible Goods and Chores: Insights via Matchings NSTL国家科技图书文献中心

Vishwa Prakash H. V. | Prajakta Nimbhorkar - 《International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: Auckland, New Zealand, 6-10 May 2024, volume 2 of 4》 - International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - 2024, - 780～788 - 共9页

摘要： and chores for agents with ordinal preferences* and* | WPROP1 under* all additive valuations consistent with* | agents' ordinal preferences. We give a polynomial-time | problem of finding perfect matchings* in a bipartite* | perfect matchings* and show the incompatibility of Pareto*

关键词： Fair division | Matchings | Proportionality

8. Not all is lost: Sorting and self-stabilizing sets NSTL国家科技图书文献中心

Peralta, Esteban - 《Games and economic behavior》 - 2024,146 - 51～58 - 共8页

摘要： transfers, stable matchings* are positive assortative when* | agents' preferences* are strictly monotonic in each* | matchings that exhibit negative sorting when types on one | It is well known that in the absence of | other's types and types are commonly known. Instead

关键词： Incomplete information | Sorting | Stable matching

9. Popular critical matchings in the many-to-many setting NSTL国家科技图书文献中心

Nasre M. | Nimbhorkar P.... - 《Theoretical computer science》 - 2024,982 - 114281～ - 共23页

摘要： matching problem in the presence of two-sided preferences | popular matching in the set of critical matchings. A | matching is popular in a given set of matchings* if it* | pairs of matchings. We show that there always exists a | matching that is popular in the set of critical matchings

关键词： Critical | Lower quotas | Many-to-many | Matching | Popular | Two-sided preferences

10. Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list NSTL国家科技图书文献中心

Schlotter, Ildiko - 《Theoretical computer science》 - 2024,994 - 114445～ - 共17页

摘要： where vertices have preferences* over their neighbors* | , and I admits a master list if all preferences* can be* | preferences, (ii) k edge deletions, or (iii) k vertex | stable and popular matchings. | A preference* system I is an undirected graph*

摘要： Roommate Allocation, where students have preferences* over* | (under* two distinct notions of payoff). Both problems* | preferences. We then analyze the problems through the lens | utilitarian matchings* and stable roommate problems.* | We study two roommate assignment problems

关键词： Roommate problem | Hedonic games | Perfect matching | Envy-freeness | Coalition formation | NP-hardness

摘要： extend naturally to preferences* over matchings. A* | . The preferences* of a vertex over its neighbors* | it is only max-utility matchings* that are relevant* | -utility matchings; moreover, such a matching can be | matchings and show a compact extended formulation for the

关键词： Bipartite graphs | Stable matchings | Dual certificates

摘要：In a graph where vertices have preferences | the matchings. Popular matchings* can be seen as an* | intermediate category between stable matchings* and maximum* | -size matchings. In this article, we aim to maximize | instances where preferences* on one side admit a master*

关键词： Popular matching | stable matching | complexity | master lists

摘要： requests. Understanding drivers' preferences* is vital for* | unsuccessful matchings. We investigate the ride-acceptance | drivers' preferences* which allows us to better* | This paper investigates the ride-acceptance | behavior of drivers on ride-sourcing platforms

关键词： Ride-acceptance behavior | Drift-diffusion model | Response time | Driver preferences | Ride-sourcing

摘要：We study popularity for matchings under | preferences. This solution concept captures matchings that | preferences of a single agent while obtaining N P | find a complexity dichotomy based on preference | do not lose against any other matching in a

关键词： Matchings under preferences | Popularity | Robustness

摘要： problem under* lexicographic preference domains from a* | in the strong core of fractional matchings. In | reverse-lexicographic preferences* the strong core is* | © 2024 The Author(s)We study strong core and | Pareto-optimal solutions for multiple partners matching

关键词： Computation complexity | Core | Lexicographic preferences | Many-to-many matching | Stable matchings

摘要： and chores for agents with ordinal preferences* and* | WPROP1 under* all additive valuations consistent with* | agents' ordinal preferences. We give a polynomial-time | problem of finding perfect matchings* in a bipartite* | perfect matchings* and show the incompatibility of Pareto*

关键词： Fair division | Matchings | Proportionality

摘要： transfers, stable matchings* are positive assortative when* | agents' preferences* are strictly monotonic in each* | matchings that exhibit negative sorting when types on one | It is well known that in the absence of | other's types and types are commonly known. Instead

关键词： Incomplete information | Sorting | Stable matching

摘要： matching problem in the presence of two-sided preferences | popular matching in the set of critical matchings. A | matching is popular in a given set of matchings* if it* | pairs of matchings. We show that there always exists a | matching that is popular in the set of critical matchings

关键词： Critical | Lower quotas | Many-to-many | Matching | Popular | Two-sided preferences

摘要： where vertices have preferences* over their neighbors* | , and I admits a master list if all preferences* can be* | preferences, (ii) k edge deletions, or (iii) k vertex | stable and popular matchings. | A preference* system I is an undirected graph*

关键词： Preference system | Master list | Parameterized complexity | Approximation | Preference swap | Vertex/edge deletion | MARRIAGE

4008-161-200 800-990-8900

国家科技图书文献中心

摘要： Roommate Allocation, where students have preferences over | (under two distinct notions of payoff). Both problems | preferences. We then analyze the problems through the lens | utilitarian matchings and stable roommate problems. | We study two roommate assignment problems

关键词： Roommate problem | Hedonic games | Perfect matching | Envy-freeness | Coalition formation | NP-hardness

摘要： extend naturally to preferences over matchings. A | . The preferences of a vertex over its neighbors | it is only max-utility matchings that are relevant | -utility matchings; moreover, such a matching can be | matchings and show a compact extended formulation for the

关键词： Bipartite graphs | Stable matchings | Dual certificates

摘要：In a graph where vertices have preferences | the matchings. Popular matchings can be seen as an | intermediate category between stable matchings and maximum | -size matchings. In this article, we aim to maximize | instances where preferences on one side admit a master

关键词： Popular matching | stable matching | complexity | master lists

摘要： requests. Understanding drivers' preferences is vital for | unsuccessful matchings. We investigate the ride-acceptance | drivers' preferences which allows us to better | This paper investigates the ride-acceptance | behavior of drivers on ride-sourcing platforms

关键词： Ride-acceptance behavior | Drift-diffusion model | Response time | Driver preferences | Ride-sourcing

摘要：We study popularity for matchings under | preferences. This solution concept captures matchings that | preferences of a single agent while obtaining N P | find a complexity dichotomy based on preference | do not lose against any other matching in a

关键词： Matchings under preferences | Popularity | Robustness

摘要： problem under lexicographic preference domains from a | in the strong core of fractional matchings. In | reverse-lexicographic preferences the strong core is | © 2024 The Author(s)We study strong core and | Pareto-optimal solutions for multiple partners matching

关键词： Computation complexity | Core | Lexicographic preferences | Many-to-many matching | Stable matchings

摘要： and chores for agents with ordinal preferences and | WPROP1 under all additive valuations consistent with | agents' ordinal preferences. We give a polynomial-time | problem of finding perfect matchings in a bipartite | perfect matchings and show the incompatibility of Pareto

关键词： Fair division | Matchings | Proportionality

摘要： transfers, stable matchings are positive assortative when | agents' preferences are strictly monotonic in each | matchings that exhibit negative sorting when types on one | It is well known that in the absence of | other's types and types are commonly known. Instead

关键词： Incomplete information | Sorting | Stable matching

摘要： matching problem in the presence of two-sided preferences | popular matching in the set of critical matchings. A | matching is popular in a given set of matchings if it | pairs of matchings. We show that there always exists a | matching that is popular in the set of critical matchings

关键词： Critical | Lower quotas | Many-to-many | Matching | Popular | Two-sided preferences

摘要： where vertices have preferences over their neighbors | , and I admits a master list if all preferences can be | preferences, (ii) k edge deletions, or (iii) k vertex | stable and popular matchings. | A preference system I is an undirected graph

关键词： Preference system | Master list | Parameterized complexity | Approximation | Preference swap | Vertex/edge deletion | MARRIAGE

4008-161-200 800-990-8900

国家科技图书文献中心

摘要： Roommate Allocation, where students have preferences* over* | (under* two distinct notions of payoff). Both problems* | preferences. We then analyze the problems through the lens | utilitarian matchings* and stable roommate problems.* | We study two roommate assignment problems

摘要： extend naturally to preferences* over matchings. A* | . The preferences* of a vertex over its neighbors* | it is only max-utility matchings* that are relevant* | -utility matchings; moreover, such a matching can be | matchings and show a compact extended formulation for the

摘要：In a graph where vertices have preferences | the matchings. Popular matchings* can be seen as an* | intermediate category between stable matchings* and maximum* | -size matchings. In this article, we aim to maximize | instances where preferences* on one side admit a master*

摘要： requests. Understanding drivers' preferences* is vital for* | unsuccessful matchings. We investigate the ride-acceptance | drivers' preferences* which allows us to better* | This paper investigates the ride-acceptance | behavior of drivers on ride-sourcing platforms

摘要： problem under* lexicographic preference domains from a* | in the strong core of fractional matchings. In | reverse-lexicographic preferences* the strong core is* | © 2024 The Author(s)We study strong core and | Pareto-optimal solutions for multiple partners matching

摘要： and chores for agents with ordinal preferences* and* | WPROP1 under* all additive valuations consistent with* | agents' ordinal preferences. We give a polynomial-time | problem of finding perfect matchings* in a bipartite* | perfect matchings* and show the incompatibility of Pareto*

摘要： transfers, stable matchings* are positive assortative when* | agents' preferences* are strictly monotonic in each* | matchings that exhibit negative sorting when types on one | It is well known that in the absence of | other's types and types are commonly known. Instead

摘要： matching problem in the presence of two-sided preferences | popular matching in the set of critical matchings. A | matching is popular in a given set of matchings* if it* | pairs of matchings. We show that there always exists a | matching that is popular in the set of critical matchings

摘要： where vertices have preferences* over their neighbors* | , and I admits a master list if all preferences* can be* | preferences, (ii) k edge deletions, or (iii) k vertex | stable and popular matchings. | A preference* system I is an undirected graph*